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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
On plaintiff's appeals from both orders, the Second Department
held that the ninety-day expiration provision contained in CPLR
6214(e) pertains to a notice of levy and not an attachment order. There-
fore, since the attachment order remained valid, the second sum of
money could be retained pursuant thereto.
The result achieved is clearly correct. For, a determination that
the attachment order expired at the end of the ninety days would con-
tradict the provisions of CPLR 6224.213 Moreover, a different result
would have required the return of the money, a new levy and an addi-
tional seizure, and the plaintiff's claim might have been subordinated
to the claim of an intervening creditor. Even though a court can now
extend a notice of levy after the ninety-day period has expired,214 there
appears to be no justification for requiring a new seizure in circum-
stances such as these.
However, one should carefully scrutinize the facts present in the
instant case. The default judgment was vacated, but the action was
still pending. Had the action been dismissed, e.g., for lack of jurisdic-
tion of the person, a different result would be warranted. In such an
instance, and in similar situations, no justification would exist for giv-
ing the plaintiff priority over a creditor who attached property before
the plaintiff could institute a new action.
ARTICLE 65- NOTICE OF PENDENCY
CPLR 6513: Section is self-executing; court may not deny CPLR 6514
motion to cancel if notice of pendency is more than three years old.
New York at one time followed the common-law rule which de-
clared that a notice of pendency was effective until the termination
of the action.21 5 However, with the enactment of the CPA216 and the
subsequent adoption of the CPLR,217 a lis pendens is subject to a
definite time limit unless extended by court order. CPLR 6513 mandates
that "[a] notice of pendency shall be effective for a period of three
years ... [unless] ... [a]n extension order shall be filed, recorded and
indexed before expiration of the prior period."
213 CPLR 6224 governs the expiration of an attachment order:
An order of attachment is annulled when the action in which it was granted
abates or is discontinued, or a judgment entered therein in favor of the plaintiff
is fully satisfied, or a judgment is entered therein in favor of the defendant....
214 See Seider v. Roth, 28 App. Div. 2d 698, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1967). For
an extensive analysis of the recent developments relating to CPLR 6214 see 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 6214, supp. commentary 33-34 (1968).
215 See 7A WK&M 6513.01 (1969).
216 CPA 121(a).
217 CPLR 6513.
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In Robins v. Goldstein,21 the appellate division reversed a lower
COUt determination hkldirng that, although the lis pendens was more
than three years old, a court, in its discretion, could deny a CPLR 6514
motion to cancel. Indeed, it was concluded that GPLR 6513 actually
mandated such cancellation. 219
Although CPLR 6514(b) allows a court certain discretion when
confronted with a motion to cancel, the clear and unequivocal wording
of 6513 appears to constitute an exception to such latitude. Moreover,
6514(b) pertains to a lis pendens which is not more than three years
old and was clearly intended to encompass those instances where a
"neglect to prosecute" or the lack of a "good faith pursuit" might
require cancellation. 220 The Robbins decision clearly demonstrates that
CPLR 6513 is self-executing;221 plaintiffs must move to extend the notice
of pendency before the expiration of the three-year period if they wish
to give valid constructive notice to potential purchasers or en-
cumbrancers.
ATICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7510: United States treaty does not supplant the common law.
In Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros., Inc.,222 a German
national sought enforcement of a German arbitration award pursuant
to CPLR 7510. According to a treaty between the United States and
Germany, awards in arbitration "which are final and enforceable under
the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed conclusive in
.. the courts of either party .... ,,223 The defendant, however, argued
that the award, although final, was unenforceable in Germany because
218 32 App. Div. 2d 1047, 303 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't 1969).
219 The courts, in analyzing a similar provision in CPA 121(a), held that the expira-
tion of three years mandated cancellation and that the section was self-executing. Carvel-
Dan-Freeze Stores, Inc. v. Lukon, 219 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1961),
modified, 18 App. Div. 2d 700, 236 N.Y.S.2d 374, 239 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't 1963).
220 See Sunshine v. Ainspan, 39 Misc. 2d 292, 240 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1962). See also 7A WK&M 6514.10 (1969).
221 CPLR 6512 similarly mandates that if a notice of pendency is filed before an
action is commenced it is effective only if service is perfected within 50 days, The second
department construed this provision's predecessors (CPA 120 and 123), as imposing an
obligation upon the court to cancel unless the filing party specifically conformed to the
requirement. See Langoff v. Bader, 13 App. Div. 2d 995, 216 N,Y..2d 639 (2d Dep't 1961).
It js also interesting to note section 17 of the Lien Law which states that no lien
shall be effective for more than one year unless extended by the court. N.Y. LIEN LIAv
§ 17 (McKinney 1965). In In r4 Bullock, 129 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954), the
court reasoned that this provision was also self-executing and, hence, the lien automatically
lapsed.
222 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct, N.Y. County 1969).
223Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, TIA.S. No. 3593 (effective July 14, 196).
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